Western New England Law Review
Volume 30 30 (2007-2008)
Issue 2

Article 7

1-1-2008

FOURTH AMENDMENT—GUILT BY
RELATION: IF YOUR BROTHER IS
CONVICTED OF A CRIME, YOU TOO MAY
DO TIME
Lina A. Hogan

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Lina A. Hogan, FOURTH AMENDMENT—GUILT BY RELATION: IF YOUR BROTHER IS CONVICTED OF A CRIME, YOU
TOO MAY DO TIME, 30 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 543 (2008), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss2/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

FOURTH AMENDMENT-GuILT BY RELATION: IF YOUR
BROTHER Is CONVICTED OF A CRIME, You Too MAY Do TIME
"The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. "1

INTRODUCTION

Given advancing technology and growing safety concerns in re
cent years, U.S. citizens have suffered a loss of privacy at the hands
of the government. 2 For the most part, citizens have silently en
dured with the understanding that zealous governmental actions are
well intentioned and designed to protect Americans. 3 But a new
privacy concern has now emerged that should cause Americans
great alarm. This new governmental surveillance tactic is designed
to generate criminal suspects based solely upon genetics. It targets
people for criminal investigation based upon their relationship to a
person who has, at some point in time, been convicted of a crime.
It is called a familial search.
On one hand, society wants criminals to be identified and pun
ished for their crimes. On the other hand, innocent family mem
bers should not forfeit their privacy rights simply because they are
related to someone who has been convicted of a crime. 4 Consider
the following hypothetical.
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. School children have been forced to have their fingerprints scanned before eat
ing lunch in their cafeteria, cameras have been installed at public shrines, people are
subjected to full-body x-rays and baggage searches at airports, and facial recognition
cameras are used at public sporting events. Bob Barr, Op-Ed., What Is Happening to
Our Privacy?, DAILY COURIER (Connellsville, Pa.), July 8, 2003, available at 2003
WLNR 13948726 (Westlaw).
3. While a majority of people polled stated that President Bush should obtain a
warrant before monitoring private phone conversations and Internet communications,
other data indicate that when balancing privacy concerns against fighting the threat of
terrorism, people view safety as the higher priority. Tom Raum, How Far Will the Gov
ernment Go on Spying?, BUCKS COUNTY COURIER TIMES (Pa.), Jan. 22, 2006, at 1B,
available at 2006 WLNR 1390337 (Westlaw).
4. CBS News.com, A Not So Perfect Match: How Near-DNA Matches Can In
criminate Relatives of Criminals, July 15, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/
23/60minutes/main2600721.shtml (last visited Dec. 24, 2007) [hereinafter A Not So Per
fect Match] (Stephen Mercer, a Maryland attorney, admonishing the use of familial
searChes).
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Your Brother's Sin-A Hypothetical

Brian Taylor and his brothers were brought up by their father
in a poor neighborhood in Hartford, Connecticut. Brian's brothers
have engaged in criminal lifestyles from the time they were teenag
ers. Nicholas, Brian's brother, is incarcerated in Connecticut for
armed robbery. Resisting a life of crime, Brian committed himself
to his studies and earned a doctorate in psychology. He is now an
esteemed professor at Harvard University. Although Brian loves
his brothers, he cut off all ties with them many years ago. In an
attempt to maintain an untarnished reputation and avoid the
trouble that surrounds his family, Brian has kept his family history a
secret from his peers at Harvard.
One dark, icy, December night Brian was on campus walking
to his car when his student, Jessica, approached him. They spoke
for a few minutes. Because it was dark and not too many students
were on campus, Brian offered to walk Jessica to her car. Jessica
accepted. As they walked, Jessica slipped on the ice, grabbed
Brian's hand to stop her fall, and accidentally scratched him. Brian
did not mention it, and Jessica did not realize that she scratched
him. At Jessica's car, Brian told her to drive safely, said goodbye,
and walked away.
As Jessica sat in her car waiting for her windshield to defrost,
she realized that she left her purse in the school. Although she
dreaded the thought of braving the parking lot again, she needed
her purse. As soon as Jessica stepped out of her car she was forced
back in and brutally raped. She never saw her attacker's face. Jes
sica fought very hard, as she screamed and kicked her attacker.
The attacker wore a condom, facemask, hat, jacket, and gloves.
He left no DNA behind. Forensic DNA was recovered, however.
It was Brian's DNA found under Jessica's nails, which the police
wrongly assumed belonged to her attacker. The DNA was submit
ted to Massachusetts law enforcement to run through the DNA
indexing database. The goal was to match the forensic DNA to
DNA stored in the database belonging to someone with a criminal
record.
In the meantime, the police interviewed Brian since he was the
last person to see Jessica before the rape. The police initially ruled
him out. Later, they received information from Connecticut law
enforcement about a near-match hit to the forensic DNA found
under Jessica's nails. It belonged to Brian's brother, Nicholas. The
police knew the forensic DNA did not belong to Nicholas because
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he was incarcerated when the rape occurred. However, they
surmised that the attacker must have been Brian since he was the
last person to see Jessica before the rape and based on the similari
ties between the forensic DNA and the DNA found in the DNA
indexing database. Consequently, the police obtained a warrant for
Brian's DNA to compare to the forensic DNA. Not surprisingly,
Brian's DNA matched the forensic DNA. Arrested and charged
with rape, Brian is now awaiting trial. Brian is innocent.
His attorney is attempting to have the DNA evidence sup
pressed at trial. His argument is that the DNA evidence is poison
ous fruit because the police obtained it based on information
gleaned from an unconstitutional familial search of the DNA-index
ing database.
B.

The Problem

The FBI now permits the use of familial searches to investigate
crimes. s As illustrated by the hypothetical, the use of familial
searches may lead to devastating results because innocent family
members, who would not have been suspected but for a genetic
link, may be transformed into criminal suspects. The legal issue is
whether familial searches amount to unreasonable searches by the
government in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The FBI's pol
icy concerning familial searches is so new that no court has reported
a decision on this issue yet. This Note anticipates the potential ar
guments that defendants who have been targeted by law enforce
ment based on familial searches might make and ultimately
concludes that familial searches are unconstitutional.
Part I provides a background on DNA. An introduction to the
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), the database that stores
DNA, is set out in Part I.A. Parts I.B and I.C respectively discuss
DNA as a powerful crime-solving tool and the pros and cons of
CODIS. Part I.D presents new developments in the use of DNA
profiling.
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
governmental searches and seizures is described in detail in Part II.
Parts II.A and II.B set out the purpose and scope of the Fourth
Amendment, including the standing and reasonableness tests. Part
III discusses the treatment of a search and seizure absent individu
alized suspicion of wrongdoing, which includes an introduction to
5. Mark Hansen, Match Point: How a Denver Rape Probe Got the FBI to Change
Policy and Release Kinship DNA, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2006, at 49.
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the special needs test in Part III.A. An additional safeguard to the
special needs test adopted by the Supreme Court is set out in Part
III.B. Part III.C depicts the application of the special needs test in
the context of mandatory DNA extractions for the purpose of anal
ogy to familial searches. This is followed by Part IV, which ana
lyzes the constitutionality of a familial search. Specifically, Part
IY.A maintains that a family member has standing to bring a
Fourth Amendment claim against the government and Part IV.B
argues that familial searches are unreasonable governmental intru
sions. Finally, this Note concludes that familial searches are
unconstitutional.
I.
A.

A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON DNA

The Combined DNA Index System Program: Its Composition
and Inner Workings

In 1990, the FBI began a pilot program called CODIS.6 Ac
cording to the FBI, CODIS is primarily a crime-solving tool.7
CODIS has three tiers: national (NDIS), state, and local. 8 The
DNA profiles begin at the local level and flow upward to the higher
levels. 9 NDIS is the highest tier in the CODIS program,lO with the
state and local levels sharing information with the national tier. l l
The CODIS program has two indices: forensic and offender.12
Working together, the indices help to create investigatory leadsP
Biological evidence collected from a crime scene is stored in the
forensic index and individuals' DNA profiles are stored in the of
6. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Combined DNA Index System, at 1, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/pdf/codisbrochure.pdf [hereinafter Combined DNA Index
System]. In 2000, the DNA Act was passed by Congress. It provides that DNA belong
ing to certain offenders may be extracted, collected, and analyzed by the government.
DNA Act, 42 U.S.c. § 14,135 (2000).
7. Combined DNA Index System, supra note 6, at 1. The FBI's use of CODIS
has assisted in solving tough crimes. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Recent CODIS
Success Stories, http://www.fbi.gov/success.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2007) (reporting
that Wayne DuMond, on parole for rape in Arkansas, was arrested and convicted for
the murder of Carol Shields in September 2001 based on DNA evidence found under
her fingernails and stored in the NDIS database-notwithstanding the fact that the
crime scene was meticulously cleaned). The same FBI report states that CODIS solved
the oldest believed "cold" case-the 1968 murder of a fourteen-year-old girl, Linda
Harmon, of San Francisco. Id.
8. Combined DNA Index System, supra note 6, at 4.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1.
13. Id.
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fender index. These profiles are collected pursuant to state and
federal statutes that allow the authorities to extract, store, and ana
lyze DNA of convicts, probationers, parolees, and arrestees. 14 The
majority of DNA profiles stored in NDIS are those of convicted
felons who have served time for crimes such as assault and battery,
rape, murder, and robbery.15 The evidence stored in the forensic
index is run in CaDIS against the offender index to find a match
between the biological evidence and a particular offender. 16 If
there is a match to a convict, the police consider him to be a good
suspect.17
According to the FBI, 59,600 investigations have been aided by
CaDIS between 1990 and October 2007. 18 Also as of October
2007, the total number of DNA profiles stored in NDIS was
5,265,258, of which 194,785 were forensic profiles and 5,070,473
were convicted offender profiles.t9
B.

DNA: A Complex and Powerful Crime-Solving Tool

Given its unique ability to identify people, DNA has become a
priceless tool for law enforcement in solving crimes. 2o DNA, for
mally known as deoxyribonucleic acid?1 is the fundamental build
ing block of an individual's entire genetic makeup.22 While DNA is
highly complex, it is generally described as follows:
DNA is a double-helix shaped nucleic acid held together by hy
drogen bonds and composed of base pairings of Adenine and
Thymine and Cytosine and Guanine, which repeat along the
double-helix at different regions (referred to as short-tandem-re
14. [d.
15. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Science and Technology in the Name of Justice,
Part 2: FBI DNA Database Passes an Important Milestone, http://www.fbLgov/page2/
feb04/codis020304.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2007).
16. See Combined DNA Index System, supra note 6, at 1.
17. Editorial, Use the Tools: With Proper Safeguards, Use of DNA Matching Can
Be Expanded, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Aug. 28, 2006 [hereinafter Use the Tools],
available at 2006 WLNR 14894295 (Westlaw).
18. CaDIS-Measuring Success, http://www.fbLgov/hq/lab/codis/success.htm
(last visited Dec. 23, 2007).
19. CaDIS-Statistical Clickable Map, NDIS Statistics, http://www.fbLgovlhq/
lab/codis/c1ickmap.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2007).
20. See Use the Tools, supra note 17.
21. Henry T. Greely et ai., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to
Catch Offenders' Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 249 (2006).
22. Dep't of Justice, What Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know About
DNA Evidence: What Is DNA?, http://www.ncjrs.gov/nij/DNAbro/what.html (last vis
ited Dec. 23, 2007) [hereinafter What Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know].
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peat loci, or STR loci). When analyzed, these STR loci reveal
the presence of various alleles, genic variants responsible for pro
ducing a particular trait, that represent themselves differently in
virtually everyone except identical twins, who share the same
DNA.23

DNA can be found, for example, in a person's blood, hair, and
tissue. 24 Forensic DNA evidence can be found on a weapon or any
item that has touched a person's body, such as a hairbrush, tooth
brush, or under someone else's fingernails. 25
Even DNA that is decades old can be used to solve crimes or
rule out suspects, though the quality of DNA can be compromised
by several factors.26 Just as officers have been trained to collect
fingerprints from a crime scene, they now test for DNA evidence,
which may be invisible to the naked eye, but is nonetheless helpful
in solving the crime. 27 The power of forensic DNA found at a crime
scene is immense because it can not only destroy a suspect's alibi by
proving that the suspect was at the scene of a crime, but it can also
show the manner in which the crime was committed.2s For exam
ple, it may prove that the suspect held the weapon. 29
When a familial search is conducted, DNA collected from a
crime scene that produces a near-match hit to a convict can deter
mine if the suspect is a relative of that convict. 3D While complete
strangers might share a few common alleles,31 the chance that two
23. Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted).
24. What Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know, supra note 22 ("DNA is
... in blood, semen, skin cells, tissue, organs, muscle, brain cells, bone, teeth, hair,
saliva, mucus, perspiration, fingernails, urine, feces, etc.").
25. President's DNA Initiative, Identifying DNA Evidence, http://www.dna.gov/
audiences/investigatorslknow/identifying (last visited Dec. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Identi
fying DNA Evidence] (citing a variety of examples where DNA can be found, including
a baseball bat or other weapon, hat, facemask, eyeglasses, cotton swab, toothpick, used
cigarette, stamp, envelope, tape, bottle, glass, used condom, blanket, pillow, sheet,
through and through bullet, bite mark, fingernail, etc.).
26. What Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know, supra note 22 (warning
that factors such as "heat, sunlight, moisture, bacteria, and mold" can destroy DNA).
New software has been created that claims to help interpret DNA which was previously
unusable because of poor quality. BBC News, New DNA Test to Solve More Cases,
Oct. 4, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2Ihiluk_news/england/5404402.stm (last visited Dec.
24,2007).
27. What Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know, supra note 22.
28. See Identifying DNA Evidence, supra note 25.
29. Id.
30. Greely et aI., supra note 21, at 251.
31. Id. at 252. An allele is "any of the alternative forms of a gene that may occur
at a given locus." MERRIAM-WEBSTER's COLLEGIATE DICIlONARY 32 (11th ed. 2003).
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unrelated people share thirteen alleles in common is "infinitesi
mal."32 Parents, siblings, and children generally share at least one
half of the same alleles. 33 Relatives of further degree, such as
aunts, uncles, grandparents, grandchildren, and half-siblings share
one-quarter of the same alleles. 34 Relatives of even further degree,
such as cousins, great-grandparents, and great-grandchildren share
one-eighth of the same alleles. 35 The danger is when a near-match
hit is produced the law enforcement authorities will arbitrarily gen
erate a suspect pool based on the convict's family members, which
implicates privacy concerns.
C.

The Pros and Cons of CODIS

Because DNA is such a powerful tool, the DNA stored in
CaDIS has been extremely beneficial to society.36 It has helped to
solve crimes and also to clear suspects of charges. 37 Our criminal
justice system is imperfect and sometimes innocent people are in
carcerated while true criminals remain free. 38 CaDIS has been
used to free some of the innocent people who have been wrongly
convicted. 39 Death-row inmates' lives have been spared based on
postconviction DNA testing. 40 The innocence Project reports that
212 people in the United States have been exonerated based on
DNA evidence. 41 Since 1973, 126 defendants on death row have
32.
33.
34.
35.

Greely et aI., supra note 21, at 250.
Id. at 251-52.
Id. at 252.
Id.

36. See Use the Tools, supra note 17.
37. Am. Soc'y of Law, Med. & Ethics, DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberties
Project, http://www.aslme.orgldna_04/description.php (last visited Dec. 24, 2007) [here
inafter DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberties Project].
38. Innocence Project, The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, http://www.innocence
project.orglunderstand (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). Some of the factors leading to false
convictions are: false confessions, bad lawyering, microscopic hair comparison, defec
tive or fraudulent science, prosecutorial misconduct, and mistaken identification. Id.
Dennis Maher of Massachusetts was wrongly convicted and sentenced to life imprison
ment for rape, assault with intent to rape, assault and battery, and aggravated rape in
1984. Innocence Project, Dennis Maher, http://www.innocenceproject.orglContentl205.
php (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). Maher was a sergeant in the U.S. Army at the time.
After nineteen years of imprisonment, he was exonerated-the real perpetrator has not
been discovered. Id.
39. Innocence Project, Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, http://www.
innocenceproject.orglContentl351.php (last visited Dec. 23, 2007).
40. Innocence Project, Mission Statement, http://www.innocenceproject.orgl
aboutlMission-Statement.php (last visited Dec. 23, 2007).
41. Id. "DNA testing has been a major factor in changing the criminal justice
system. It has provided scientific proof that our system convicts and sentences innocent
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been exonerated. 42 Further, DNA profiling has assisted families in
locating the remains of their loved ones killed in the terrorist at
tacks of September 11, 2001, and gaining some measure of
closure. 43
On the other hand, the storage of DNA in CODIS has also
been criticized based upon privacy concerns. Commentators argue
that the mass storage of DNA is a breach of privacy, especially
given the personal information that the DNA may contain. 44 For
example, it may reveal information about whether a person has a
genetic disorder or a predisposition to disease. 45 It could indicate
whether a person has a propensity for addiction to drugs or alcohol
or other traits that could be used by the police to profile individu
als. 46 In addition, if a list of individuals that have DNA stored in
COD IS is released to third parties, the mere fact that their DNA is
in CaDIS might have adverse effects for those individuals. 47
D.

New Developments in the Use of DNA Profiling

The FBI is in charge of the national tier of CODIS and the
sharing of information between the states.48 When a state is unable
people ...." Innocence Project, About the Innocence Project, http://www.innocence
project.org/about (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). The Innocence Project, located at the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, was founded by Barry C. Scheck and Peter J.
Neufeld in 1992. Id.
42. Innocence and the Death Penalty, http;llwww.deathpenaltyinfo.orgiartic1e.
php?did=412&scid=6 (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). Unfortunately, some people die in
prison before they are exonerated. Samuel R. Gross et aI., Exonerations in the United
States: 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005) (noting
"four cases where states posthumously acknowledged the innocence of defendants who
had already died in prison").
43. See DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberties Project, supra note 37. Joan
Greener of Salem, Massachusetts, received news in September 2006 that her niece's
remains-as a victim of September ll-were finally identified due to DNA results.
Amy Westfeldt, Discovery of More 9/11 Remains Proves Tough for Some Families, IN
TELLIGENCER (N.Y.), Nov. 12, 2006, at All, available at 2006 WLNR 19874534
(Westlaw). The news brought sad emotions, but ultimately, Greener was glad the dis
covery was made. Id.
44. See, e.g., Gregory D. Kesich, DNA Use at Issue in Murder Case: The Lawyer
for the Man Accused of Killing Crystal Perry Says Taking Sample Was Unconstitutional,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Oct. 20, 2006, at B1, available at 2006 WLNR 18240747
(Westlaw) (noting the potential to invade a person's privacy).
45. DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberties Project, supra note 37.
46. /d.
47. See id. (predicting that the mere knowledge that an individual's DNA is
stored in CaDIS might persuade adoption agencies, insurance companies, and employ
ers to avoid dealing with the individual based on a preconceived notion that the individ
ual is a criminal).
48. Hansen, supra note 5, at 49.
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to obtain a match in its database, it can search the national database
to find a match. 49 In the past, if the state found a hit in the national
database, the FBI would only share the identifying information if
there was an exact match. 50 In other words, the FBI would not re
lease the identity of an individual if the hit produced only a near
match. 51 However, on July 14, 2006, the FBI adopted a new policy
of allowing information about the near-match hits to be released. 52
The practice of using familial searches to obtain near-match hits to
investigate family members of convicts who have DNA stored in
CODIS will expand the use of the database beyond its original
purpose. 53
Some criminologists say that familial searches will intrude on
the privacy of family members. 54 It is "genetic surveillance" of in
nocent relatives 55 that will transform them into criminal suspects. 56
On the other hand, law enforcement officials argue that a near
match hit only produces a "lead" that should be pursued in an in
vestigation. 57 They say that it is the equivalent of an eyewitness
reporting to the police that the suspect looked and sounded exactly
like Joe Smith, but it is much more reliable than an eyewitness. 58

49. See id. A "match" or "hit" occurs when the DNA stored in the forensic index
is the same as the DNA in stored in the offender index. COD IS, National DNA Index
System, http://www.fhLgov/hq/lab/codis/national.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2007).
50. Hansen, supra note 5, at 49.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. In Colorado, the police ran a search through NDIS to identify a rapist
who beat his victim so badly that she had to have her eye surgically removed. Id. at 48.
The search produced only a near-match hit to a man in Oregon. Id. The police be

lieved that the near-match hit strongly suggested that a relative of the Oregon man was
the rapist, and if they could prove that the relative was in Denver at the time of the
rape, the crime was as good as solved. Id. However, because FBI policy did not allow
information to be released when a match was not exact, the FBI initially refused to
reveal the Oregon man's name. Id. at 49. After some persistence, the FBI changed its
policy and released the Oregon man's name to the police in Colorado. /d.
53. Use the Tools, supra note 17.
54. Sally Lehrman, Partial to Crime: Families Become Suspects as Rules on DNA
Matches Relax, SCI. AM., Dec. 1, 2006, at 28, available at 2006 WLNR 22637249
(Westlaw).
55. Richard Willing, DNA Database Can Flag Suspects Through Relatives: Critics
Fear 'Genetic Surveillance' of Innocent, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 2006, at 2A [hereinafter
DNA Database Can Flag Suspects], available at 2006 WLNR 14577582 (Westlaw); A
Not So Perfect Match, supra note 4.
56. See DNA Database Can Flag Suspects, supra note 55.
57. Id.
58. Use the Tools, supra note 17.
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The United Kingdom routinely uses a "familial searching tech
nique" in its National DNA Database and has enjoyed success. 59 In
the United States, it is estimated that the use of familial searches on
a national level could significantly increase the chances of finding
criminals through DNA-potentially thousands of additional iden
tifications.60 In at least one case in the United States, the familial
search has already solved a crime and exonerated a wrongly con
victed man. 61 After being incarcerated for eighteen years, Darryl
Hunt was freed when DNA from the crime scene was tested and a
search in CODIS revealed the brother of the real killer. 62
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:

A PROHIBITION AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES BY THE GOVERNMENT

A.

The Fourth Amendment's Origin and Goals

The Fourth Amendment guarantees people the right to be se
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasona
ble governmental searches and seizures. 63 The Fourth Amendment
was adopted to gain independence from the general warrants and
warrantless searches that were imposed by Britain upon the colo
nists. 64 It was adopted to protect citizens' privacy and dignity from
59. See Brenda Hickman, Rapist Faces Justice 20 Years On, NEWCASTLE EVENING
CHRON., Sept. 19,2006, at 21, available at 2006 WLNR 16243486 (Westlaw) (describing
the account of a rape victim whose attacker was caught twenty years later by use of the
familial searching technique). The technology was touted as "pioneering," and "cutting
edge." Id.
60. Randolph E. Schmid, Relatives' DNA Could Help Find Criminals: But Such
Searches Involve Ethics Issues, Some Experts Say, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 14, 2006,
at A28, available at 2006 WLNR 8272064 (WestIaw) (addressing Frederick R. Bieber's
estimate that "in a case in which there is a 10 percent chance of finding a criminal
through a DNA search, expanding the search to suspects' close relatives could raise the
chances to 14 percent," which potentially represents thousands of additional
identifications).
61. Suzanne Smalley, A Man Wrongly Accused Becomes a Symbol of Hope, Bos
TON GLOBE, May 12, 2006, at A5, available at 2006 WLNR 8172556 (Westlaw).
62. Id.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
64. British customs officers conducted general exploratory searches using general
writs of assistance against the American colonists between 1761 and 1776. PHILLIP A.
HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: A FOURTH AMENDMENT
HANDBOOK 77 (2005). General warrants have been described as "'the worst instru
ment of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental
principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book,' because they placed 'the
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.'" Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
476,481 (1965) (quoting James Otis). The warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend
ment was not adopted to shield criminals. Instead, the Fourth Amendment was
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arbitrary governmental intrusion. 65
Although the Fourth Amendment protects one of our greatest
and most fundamental individual rights, this right has been cur
tailed, at various times, by the government to protect the broader
interests of the public. 66 This is especially true of convicts' rights. 67
Although the statutorily mandated extraction and analysis of a con
vict's DNA is a search and seizure for Fourth Amendment pur
poses,68 the practice has been held to be reasonable in light of a
governmental "special need" that outweighs the convict's expecta
tion of privacy.69 If the FBI's new policy of allowing states to share
adopted in response to colonists' memories of abuse from unreasonable governmental
searches and seizures due to general warrants and warrantless searches. Chimel v. Cali
fornia, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455
(1948». Abuses such as these were considered to be a major cause of the American
Revolution. Id.
65. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989) (citing
Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967»; see also Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976)
("The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to pre
vent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and
personal security of individuals.").
66. HUBBART, supra note 64, at 5.
67. When this Note refers to "convicts," the term shall also generally include pro
bationers, parolees, and supervised releasees, unless specifically stated otherwise. Al
though there are technical differences among the legal status of these individuals, the
term "convicts" will be used for the sake of simplicity.
68. See generally Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (stating that a "physical intrusion, pene
trating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable" and "[t)he ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain
physiological data is a further invasion"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767
(1966) (commenting that "if compulsory administration of a blood test does not impli
cate the Fifth Amendment, it plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a search
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d
261,264 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding that "[a)ny forced extraction of blood ... invades
one's expectation of privacy in bodily integrity, and its reasonableness must be ad
judged under a Fourth Amendment analysis").
69. See United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that the
special need was to procure reliable identifying information, reduce recidivism, and
protect communities); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 668-69 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding
that the special need was to create a DNA-indexing database to assist in solving
crimes); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that the special need
was to create a reliable identification for storing in the database to solve past and future
crimes); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding the spe
cial need was to create a DNA-indexing database); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d
Cir. 1999) (finding that the special need was to reduce and prevent the recidivism rate).
But see United States v. Weikert (Weikert I), 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (D. Mass. 2006)
(holding that the purported special need was merely regular law enforcement pur
poses), rev'd, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir.
2007). For the purposes of this Note, Weikert I will refer to the district court's opinion
and Weikert II will refer to the opinion by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
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near-match DNA hits is challenged, opponents may argue that the
practice violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the family mem
bers, just as convicts have argued that the extraction and analysis of
DNA constitutes a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.7°

B.

The Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Its Requirements

The Fourth Amendment refers to "searches and seizures."71
But according the Supreme Court, a person can be illegally
searched absent a seizure, just as a person can have an item illegally
seized, absent an illegal search.72 The right to be free from a search
and seizure protects two separate and individual expectations and
interests.73 An illegal search intrudes upon a person's individual
privacy interest, while an illegal seizure divests a person of control
of his property.74 This Note focuses on the legality of the familial
search and does not address the seizure issue because a person has
no possessory interest in a family member's DNA.
1.

Standing Requirement for a Successful Fourth
Amendment Claim

Before a Fourth Amendment violation occurs, a person must
have standing to make such a claim. 75 For standing to be satisfied,
the person complaining must be subjected to the search,76 the
search must be recognized under the Fourth Amendment,77 and the
70. Defendants have overwhelmingly lost the battle against the forced extractions
of DNA. See Conley, 453 F.3d at 674; United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 923 (8th
Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489,491 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Nicholas, 430 F.3d
at 655; United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 2005); Padgett v. Donald,
401 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 832 (9th
Cir. 2004); Green, 354 F.3d at 679; Groceman v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413
14 (5th Cir. 2004); Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1134; Marcotte, 193 F.3d at 74; Jones v. Murray,
962 F.2d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 1992); Weikert II, 504 F.3d at 1. But see Stewart, 468 F. Supp.
2d at 282.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
72. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 118-21 (1984) (holding that no
search occurred when federal agents examined a powdery substance found in a dam
aged box opened by Federal Express employees because the defendant had no expecta
tion of privacy in the box; however, the federal agents' control over the packages was a
seizure).
73. Id. at 113.
74. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).
75. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978).
76. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 173 (1969).
77. A Fourth Amendment search is recognized when a person has a subjective
expectation of privacy against the search that society is willing to accept as reasonable.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001). The Supreme Court has held that a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas of his person that are not
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search must constitute an invasion by the government,78 A Fourth
Amendment search is recognized when a person has a subjective
expectation of privacy against the search that society is willing to
accept as reasonable. 79 If anyone of these elements is not met, a
Fourth Amendment claim will fai1. 80
The Fourth Amendment lists the items that it protects against
unreasonable searches seizures. These include a person and his
home, papers, and effects.81 However, the Fourth Amendment
does not fully speak to standing. Three Supreme Court cases artic
open to public view. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). For example, a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his pockets, inner clothing, deep lung
breaths, urine, and blood. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 68 (2001) (hold
ing that testing of urine is a search); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 603 (1989) (holding that breath tests involving deep lung breaths constitute a
search); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (holding that scraping under the
defendant's fingernails was a search); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968) (hold
ing that going through a person's pockets and inner clothing is a search protected
against by the Fourth Amendment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968) (holding
that there is a search when law enforcement pats down a person's outer clothing);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (holding that taking a person's blood
from his body is a search). Significantly, courts have recognized that a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his DNA under the Fourth Amendment. Sehmer
ber, 384 U.S. at 767; see United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 264 (D. Mass.
2007); United States v. Weikert (Weikert I), 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 262 (D. Mass. 2006),
rev'd, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007); see
also United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 679 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kraklio,
451 F.3d 922, 923 (8th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 493 (D.C. Cir.
2006); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Sczubelek,
402 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2005); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.
2005); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 676 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kincade, 379
F.3d 813, 821 n.15 (9th Cir. 2004); Groceman v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411,413
(5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003); Roe v.
Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir.
1992). Outside of the context of the Fourth Amendment, it has been held that a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his medical records and against disclosure of
personal matters. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (2d Cir.
1980) ("[I]nformation about one's body and state of health is a matter which the indi
vidual is ordinarily entitled to retain within the 'private enclave where he may lead a
private life.'" (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.3d 566, 581-82 (1956»; Com
monwealth v. West, 834 A.2d 625, 634 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
78. HUBBART, supra note 64, at 10-12. The Fourth Amendment applies to the
federal government. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled by
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Federal government employees are subject to
Fourth Amendment application. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bu
reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971). States and their employees, as well as coun
ties and municipalities, also fall under the purview of the Fourth Amendment. Stanford
v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
79. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
80. HUBBART, supra note 64, at 11-12.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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ulate the standing requirement: Katz v. United States,82 Minnesota
v. Olson,83 and Kyllo v. United States. 84
The scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection was best set
forth in Katz v. United States, which held that the Fourth Amend
ment protects people, not places. 85 In Katz, the defendant was con
victed of transmitting bets over the telephone, which was a
violation of a federal statute. 86 The FBI used an electronic listening
device placed on the outside of a public phone booth to listen to the
defendant's side of the conversation. 87 The use of the electronic
listening device and the recording was held to be an unreasonable
search and seizure in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amend
ment rights. 88 The defendant was found to have a reasonable ex
pectation of privacy in the phone booth. 89 The fact that a phone
booth is not specifically listed in the Fourth Amendment was not
dispositive. This is because it is the person's expectation of privacy
that is protected, not the place. 90 The test was set out in Justice
82. Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
83. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
84. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27.
85. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The rule before Katz was that, to be protected, the
thing searched must have been material, such as a person, house, paper, or effect. Olm
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347, and
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in
Olmstead, noted that, when analyzing the Constitution, society should not merely focus
on the evils that were in the minds of the Framers when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted, but that society must also look to the future to address the evils that may
become. Id. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Otherwise, the principles will be impo
tent and valueless. Id. Furthermore, Justice Brandeis took issue with the majority's
position that only searches of material things could be constitutionally protected. Id. at
478-79. Justice Brandeis suggested a much broader reading of the Fourth Amendment
when he stated,
The protection guaranteed by the Amendment[ 1is much broader in scope.
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be
let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi
lized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Govern
ment upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must
be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 478.
86. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 353.
89. Id. at 352.
90. Id. at 351-52.
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Harlan's concurring opinion: In order to implicate the Fourth
Amendment, a person must have a subjective expectation of pri
vacy in the thing or area searched, and that expectation must be
"one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "91
In Minnesota v. Olson,92 the Supreme Court provided further
clarification that the Fourth Amendment protects people not
places. In Olson, the police suspected the defendant's involvement
in a robbery, which ultimately resulted in the death of a store man
ager. 93 While the police were searching for Olson, they learned
that he was staying at his friend's home. 94 Without a warrant, the
police entered the home and found Olson hiding in a closet. 95 The
police arrested Olson and brought him to the police station, where
he made an inculpatory statement. 96 Although the house was not
his home, Olson claimed that he had an expectation of privacy
while he was in the house, and therefore the warrantless entry, ab
sent exigent circumstances, violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. 97
The Supreme Court held that Olson had a legitimate expecta
tion of privacy in his friend's home.98 Again, this reflects the under
standing that the Fourth Amendment's protection expands beyond
the physical person, home, papers, and effects because it is the per
son whose interests are truly protected by the Fourth Amend
ment. 99 This is true as long as the person has manifested an
expectation of privacy in the area searched that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable.1°o
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed an in
vasion of privacy in light of new technology and the reasonableness
of an expectation of privacy under the circumstances. 101 The case
examined "whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a
private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat
within the home constituted a 'search' within the meaning of the
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

[d. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
[d. at 93.
[d. at 94.

/d.
[d.

See id. at 94-95.
See id.
99. [d. at 96 n.5.
100. [d. at 95-96.
101. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
97.
98.
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Fourth Amendment."102 Law enforcement officers suspected that
the defendant was growing marijuana in his house, which would re
quire the use of strong heat lamps.103 Without a warrant, in the
dark, early morning hours, the officers used a thermal imager to
detect a high level of heat emanating from the home, which they
could not have seen without the use of the technology.lo4 The ther
mal images quickly revealed that an unusually high amount of heat
was coming from over the garage. lOS The officers obtained a war
rant based on the thermal image readings, unusually high electric
bills, and informant tips.106 Officers found approximately one hun
dred marijuana plants in the defendant's home. lo7 The defendant
was indicted for manufacturing marijuana after unsuccessfully at
tempting to suppress the marijuana evidence found in the home. lOB
The government's main argument was that the search was con
stitutional because Kyllo could not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy when the government did not actually physically in
truded into his home and the technology did not reveal any inti
mate details of the home. lo9 The Supreme Court held that a Fourth
Amendment violation can occur absent an actual physical intrusion
and rejected the "intimate details" argument.1 lO However, the rule
regarding physical intrusion is limited. An unconstitutional intru
sion is found, in the context of new technology, if the information
collected could not have been obtained without an actual physical
intrusion, without the use of the technology-at least to the extent
that the technology is not available for use to the general public. lll
To better explain this, the police in Kyllo would have had to make
an actual physical intrusion into the home to find the marijuana
evidence if they did not have the new and publicly unavailable ther
mal imaging technology.112 Therefore, if the actual physical intru
sion into the home would have been an unconstitutional invasion,
so would the invasion that lacked the actual "physical" intrusive
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
l1I.
112.

Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 30-3I.
Id. at 34.
/d.

See id.
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ness-only made capable by the new technology.113 On the other
hand, if the thermal imaging technology was readily available to the
general public, then the intrusion would not be unconstitutional be
cause the searched person had no legitimate expectation of privacy
given the public's access to the technology.114 This case exemplifies
the Supreme Court's concern with technological advances imping
ing on individuals' rights to privacy.
The lesson learned from the three cases discussed above is that
the standing requirement is satisfied if the government conducts a
search that invades an individual's subjective expectation of privacy
and that expectation of privacy is one that society would deem rea
sonable.H 5 Although a person, his home, papers, and effects are
explicitly protected by the Fourth Amendment,116 the Fourth
Amendment's protections extend further and do not require an ac
tual invasion of these things. 117 It is the subjective expectation of
an individual's privacy that is protected, so long as it is also objec
tively reasonable. 118
2.

A Search Must Be Unreasonable to Constitute a Fourth
Amendment Violation

Once a person satisfies the standing requirement, the next is
sue is whether the search was reasonable. If the search is found to
be unreasonable, then a Fourth Amendment violation has oc
curred.1 19 But if the search is reasonable, then no Fourth Amend
ment violation has occurred.1 20
The Fourth Amendment requires that law enforcement offi
cials obtain a warrant through judicial approval, whenever practica
ble. l2l An individual's privacy interest is deemed so precious that
an objective person should decide whether or not to invade the in
terest, and not a person whose job it is to solve crimes. 122 For a
113.
114.
115.

[d.
[d.
E.g., id. at 33.

116. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
117. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("[O]nce it is recognized that
the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable
searches and seizures it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn
upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.").
118. E.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
119. HUBBART, supra note 64, at 12.
120.

[d.

121. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,20 (1968).
122. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
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warrant to be issued, there must be "probable cause."123 In some
instances, a search can be conducted without a warrant; however, it
usually must be based on probable cause or a showing of individual
ized suspicion of wrongdoing.124 Otherwise, the search is consid
ered unreasonable. 125 In very limited circumstances, a search can
even be considered constitutionally reasonable without individual
ized suspicion. 126 This important exception is called the "special
needs exception," which occurs when the government has a special
need that is "beyond the normal need for law enforcement."127
This exception dispenses with the need for a warrant, probable
cause, and even individualized suspicion for searches involving, for
example, public schools, government agencies, and prisons. 128
III.

TREATMENT OF A SEARCH OR SEIZURE ABSENT AN
INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION OF WRONGDOING:
THE SPECIAL NEEDS TEST

A.

Introduction to the Special Needs Test-Eliminating the
Typical Requirements: Warrant, Probable Cause, and
Individualized Suspicion

Ordinarily, law enforcement officials are required to have a
warrant, probable cause, or in some instances, individualized suspi
cion of criminal wrongdoing in order to conduct a constitutional
search. 129 However, the Supreme Court developed the special
123. u.s. CONST. amend. IV.
124. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) (defining individualized
suspicion as "a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make
the intrusion on the individual's privacy interest reasonable"). Usually the Fourth
Amendment requires probable cause; however, "a lesser degree satisfies the Constitu
tion when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard
reasonable. . . . The same circumstances that lead to the conclusion that reasonable
suspicion is constitutionally sufficient also render a warrant requirement unnecessary."
Id. The Fourth Amendment focuses on the warrant requirement and reasonableness of
the search to guard against arbitrary governmental intrusions. Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,621-22 (1989); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719
(1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967).
125. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
126. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
127. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 653 (1995».
128. Id.; see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471,515 U.S. 646 (public schools); Nat'l Treasury
Empl. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (government agencies); T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325 (public schools).
129. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471, 515 U.S. at 653.
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needs test to determine whether a search is reasonable without a
warrant, probable cause, or suspicion of individual wrongdoing.130
The "special needs test," which carves out an exception to the
normal requirements of a warrant, probable cause, and individual
ized suspicion, was first articulated in New Jersey v. T.L.O.l3l In
T. L. 0., a fourteen-year-old girl was caught smoking in her school
bathroom. 132 The assistant vice-principal searched through the
girl's purse and found cigarettes and rolling papers.133 Based on his
experience that rolling papers were used to smoke marijuana, he
was suspicious and continued his search of her purse more thor
oughly,134 He found marijuana, among other incriminating evi
dence,135 T.L.O. claimed that the search of her purse was a
violation of her Fourth Amendment rights,136 The Court applied a
balancing test: "the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy
and personal security" versus "the government's need for effective
methods to deal with breaches of public order."137 Although the
Court found that school children do have a reasonable expectation
of privacy, the Court rejected the warrant and probable cause re
quirements in light of the government's strong need to maintain or
der in schools. 138
The concurring opinions added additional light to formulation
of the special needs test. Justice Blackmun said that the balancing
test should only reduce the warrant and probable cause require
ments of the Fourth Amendment when there is "a special law en
forcement need for greater flexibility," which makes the
requirements "impracticable."139 Further, as Justice Powell stated,
children at school have a lower expectation of privacy than the gen
eral public because school personnel have authority over the
schoolchildren, much like parents. 140 Justice Blackmun believed
that the need for an immediate response by school officials, the
schools' significant duty to protect the students, and the students'
130.

[d.

131.

T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325.
[d. at 328.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 329.
[d. at 337.
[d. at 337-41.
[d. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

491,514 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
140. [d. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).

562

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:543

lowered expectation of privacy justified dispensing with the warrant
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 141
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, the Court offi
cially adopted the special needs test and eliminated the warrant,
probable cause, and individualized suspicion requirements in cer
tain circumstances. 142 It determined that a federal regulation man
dating urine and blood testing of railroad employees was not a
violation of the employees' Fourth Amendment rights under the
special needs test. 143 According to the Court, the testing was justi
fied by the number of accidents due to employees' alcohol and drug
use. 144 The special need was to put an end to railroad accidents and
loss of human life due to employees' use of alcohol or drugs, not to
gather evidence for the prosecution of the employees,14s It also
noted the deterrent value of the regulation to keep employees clean
and sober,146

B.

The Primary Purpose and Immediate Objective of the Special
Need Must Go Beyond Typical Law Enforcement
Purposes

The Supreme Court again applied the special needs test in City
of Indianapolis v. Edmond when it held that a checkpoint program
designed to discover illegal drugs was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment. 147 The Court acknowledged that certain types
of "suspicionless" searches and seizures are constitutional if the
"program [is] designed to serve 'special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement."'148 However, the drug interdiction pro
gram in Edmond had a "primary purpose . . . to uncover evidence
of ordinary criminal wrongdoing" and was, therefore, unconstitu
tional,149 In making its decision, the Court noted that it had never
upheld a program that was designed specifically to detect criminal
wrongdoing. ISO For instance, the Court recalled invalidating a sus
picionless search that was conducted merely to check a driver's li
141. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
142. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
143. Id. at 634.
144. Id. at 606-07.
145. Id. at 620-22.
146. Id. at 629.
147. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47-48 (2000).
148. Id. at 37 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653
(1995».
149. Id. at 41-42.
150. Id. at 38.
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cense and registration on the grounds that the officer's discretion to
stop was "'standardless and unconstrained.' "151 In contrast, the
Court recounted upholding a checkpoint program "aimed [to re
duce] the immediate hazard posed by the presence of drunk drivers
on the highways, [since] there was an obvious connection between
the imperative of highway safety and the law enforcement practice
at issue."152 Accordingly, a search can be deemed reasonable even
absent an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, but only if it is
clear that the primary purpose of the activity serves a special need
beyond that of general law enforcement, and that its purpose is not
solely to obtain general evidence of criminal wrongdoing.153
Another case which helped to clarify the special needs test was
Ferguson v. City of Charleston. 154 In this case, a hospital program
forced pregnant women suspected of drug use to submit to urine
tests to determine if they were in fact taking illegal drugs while
pregnant. 155 The Supreme Court considered the searches to be sus
picionless and, as a result, it applied the special needs test. 156 The
Court cautioned that when applying the special needs test, the "im
mediate objective" of the search should be a consideration and not
the "ultimate purpose" of the search. 157 Even if the end goal of the
testing was to assist pregnant drug users to get treatment, the imme
diate objective was to obtain evidence of the drug use and to give it
to law enforcement in order to effectuate that end goal.158 The
Court reasoned that if the special needs test is viewed in light of the
broad "ultimate purpose" rather than the narrow "immediate ob
jective" of the search, every suspicionless search could be "immu
nized under the special needs doctrine. "159 Therefore, to determine
whether there is some special need beyond that of ordinary law en
forcement that creates a valid exception to the warrant require
ment, the focus must be on the immediate objective of the
governmental intrusion rather than the ultimate purpose. 160
A more recent case dealing with the special needs of law en
forcement is Illinois v. Lidster, which describes another example of
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 39 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979».
Id. (citing Mich. Dep't. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990».
See id. at 37-48.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
Id. at 70-73.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 84.
/d. at 82-83.
Id. at 84.
Id.
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a suspicionless search program. 161 The police set up a checkpoint in
response to a hit-and-run accident that left one person dead, which
was designed to acquire information about the accident from mo
torists who may have seen the hit-and-run. 162 Approaching the
checkpoint, Lidster, who was intoxicated, nearly hit an officer. 163
Lidster challenged the stop as an unlawful seizure. 164 The Court
did not reference the special needs test, but determined that the
checkpoint had an information-seeking purpose, as opposed to the
type of search conducted in Edmond, which was intended to con
trol crime. 165 The Court upheld the program as reasonable because
the stop was in response to a "grave public concern" and minimally
interfered with the motorists' liberty interests.1 66 The purpose of
the stop was to seek information from motorists about a crime that
was probably committed by someone other than those who were
questioned. 167 The Court reasoned that a vital part of police work
is to ask for information from people. 168 When there is a serious
public need, a minimal intrusion of a person's liberty interest is out
weighed if the governmental activity is designed to obtain informa
tion from people who may have witnessed but not committed the
crime,169
C.

Application of the Special Needs Test to Mandatory DNA
Extractions-United States v. Weikert

The statutes mandating extraction of DNA from convicts for
storage and analysis in CODIS have been challenged as requiring
unconstitutional searches and seizures under the Fourth Amend
ment,170 However, courts that have applied the special needs test
161. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
162. Id. at 422.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. !d. at 423.
166. Id. at 422, 427.
167. Id. at 423.
168. Id. at 425.
169. See id. at 426.
170. See, e.g., United States v. Weikert (Weikert II), 504 F.3d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 2007),
reh'g denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674,
676 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 923 (8th Cir. 2006); Johnson
v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 655 (2d
Cir. 2005); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 176 (3d Cir. 2005); Padgett v. Don
ald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2005); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir.
2004); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2004); Groceman v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 412-13 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d
1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2003); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1999); Jones v.
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to these cases have ruled that the government's special needs out
weigh the privacy interests of the convicts, and thus the statutes
have been upheld as constitutional. l71
Extraction and analysis of DNA is considered a search and
seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment because "it is obvious
that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable."l72 Not only is the extraction an intrusion into the
body but it is also an intrusion into the individual's personal privacy
and identity-especially since the information taken from the sam
ple can be used in the futureY3
However, as stated above, courts that have examined the issue
under the special needs test have overwhelmingly held that forced
DNA extractions on convicts are not unconstitutional because, not
withstanding the constitutionally protected expectation of privacy
in one's DNA, the search is reasonable under the special needs
test. 174 An obstacle under the special needs test that the courts
have had to overcome is the "primary purpose/immediate objec
tive" prong.1 75 The courts have found their way around this prong
by citing special needs such as obtaining reliable identification, proMurray, 962 F.2d 302, 303 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261,
262 (D. Mass. 2007).
171. Conley, 453 F.3d at 679 (finding that the special need was to procure reliable
identifying information, reduce recidivism, and protect communities); Nicholas, 430
F.3d at 668-69 (finding that the special need was to create a DNA-indexing database to
assist in solving crimes); Green, 354 F.3d at 679 (finding that the special need was to
create a reliable identification for storing in the database to solve past and future
crimes); Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1146 (finding the special need was to create a DNA-index
ing database); Marcotte, 193 F.3d at 79 (finding that the special need was to reduce and
prevent the recidivism rate). But see United States v. Weikert (Weikert I), 421 F. Supp.
2d at 265 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that the purported special need was merely regular
law enforcement purposes), rev'd, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g denied en bane, 504
F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007). There is also a line of cases that has analyzed the constitutional
ity of the mandatory extraction of convicts' DNA under the totality of the circum
stances test, as opposed to the special needs test. Weikert II, 504 F.3d at 3; Conley, 453
F.3d at 680-81 (analyzing the issue under both the special needs and totality of the
circumstances tests); Kraklio, 451 F.3d at 924-25; Johnson, 440 F.3d at 496; Sczubelek,
402 F.3d at 177; Groceman, 354 F.3d at 413; Jones, 962 F.2d at 308; Stewart, 468 F. Supp.
2d at 269. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled specifically on the issue of whether
familial DNA searches are constitutional.
172. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
173. Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
174. Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 668-69; Green, 354 F.3d at 679; Kimler, 335 F.3d at
1146; Marcotte, 193 F.3d at 79. But see Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 265 (holding that
the purported special need was merely regular law enforcement purposes).
175. Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 668-69; Green, 354 F.3d at 679; Marcotte, 193 F.3d at
79. But see Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 265.
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tecting communities,176 assisting in solving past and future
crimes,177 creating a DNA-indexing database,118 and reducing and
preventing recidivism. 179
In United States v. Weikert (Weikert I), the U.S. District Court
for the District of Massachusetts considered the constitutionality of
a statute mandating the extraction of a supervised releasee's
DNA.180 Although the decision was recently reversed by the Court
of Appeals in the First Circuit (Weikert II),181 both decisions are
valuable resources to analogize to a familial search scenario.
1.

Weikert I: Mandatory Extraction of DNA from a
Supervised Releasee Is Examined Under the
Special Needs Test

After serving time for conspiracy to possess drugs with the in
tent to distribute and for escape from prison, Weikert was granted
supervised release. 182 Upon release, Weikert was notified by the
probation office that he was required to submit to a procedure for
extracting his DNA, which would then be entered into CODIS.183
In response, Weikert argued that such an extraction, absent a war
rant or individualized suspicion, would violate his Fourth Amend
ment rights.1 84
Based on the three Supreme Court decisions discussed above,
Edmond,185 Ferguson,186 and Lidster,187 Weikert I held that the spe
cial needs test was the appropriate analysis 188 because the reason
for mandating extraction of Weikert's DNA was not based upon an
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.189 The court applied the
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
en bane,
182.
183.

See Conley, 453 F.3d at 679; Green, 354 F.3d at 679.
Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992).
Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1146.
Marcotte, 193 F.3d at 82; Murray, 962 F.2d at 308.
Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 259.
United States v. Weikert (Weikert II), 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g denied
504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007).
Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 260-61.
Id. at 261.
184. Id.
185. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
186. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
187. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
188. Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 264.
189. Id. The court distinguished its case from Griffin v. Wisconsin, in which the
Supreme Court held that a reasonable suspicion justified the search of a probationer's
horne without a warrant. Id. at 264-65 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880
(1987)). Because the Weikert I search was suspicionless, Griffin did not apply.
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test, as set out by Justice Blackmun in T.L.O.,190 and asked
whether, in this case, there was a special need beyond typical law
enforcement purposes. 191 Weikert I concluded that there was no
special need that justified the compulsory extraction, storage, and
analysis of DNA.1 92 Rather, the immediate purpose was to solve a
crime that Weikert mayor may not have committed. 193
Weikert I also analyzed whether the government's purported
special need outweighed Weikert's privacy interest. In examining
the intrusion, the court stated that the initial blood extraction is an
invasion of a person's privacy interest, and the storage of the infor
mation derived from the extraction and later analysis thereof con
stitutes an even greater invasion of the privacy interest at stake. 194
The court examined the scope of Weikert's privacy interest, as a
supervised releasee. 195 It explained that a supervised releasee does
not have the same level of privacy interest as a law-abiding individ
ual. The exact extent of the interest is a question that has been left
unanswered. 196 For instance, a person on supervised release may
have his home searched while he is on probation even if the police
have no search warrant and no probable cause, so long as there is
adequate reasonable suspicion. 197 The court found this analogy un
helpful because an intrusion of a person's home is much different
than that of his body,198 which deserves a higher expectation of pri
vacy. Furthermore, to justify a governmental home invasion there
must be a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, as opposed
to Weikert's circumstances where the DNA was being extracted
merely because he was on supervised release and not because he
was suspected of criminal wrongdoing.199
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See supra notes 129-139 and accompanying text.
[d. at 264 (citing Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 664 n.22 (2d Cir. 2005».
[d. at 265.
/d.
[d. at 266.
[d. at 266-68.
[d. at 266 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987), which stated

that a person on supervised release may have a liberty interest conditioned on proba
tionary rules, as opposed to an absolute liberty interest).
197. [d. (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874). A probationary period is part of the
sentence, and the person on supervised release can be sent back to prison for violating
the conditions of the supervised release. [d. at 267.
198. [d. at 266-67.
199. [d. (defining the issue as "whether such individuals have a limited privacy
interest in a suspicionless invasion into their body and their identity").
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The court then examined the privacy interests of a person in
prison,20o and determined that a supervised releasee has a privacy
interest falling somewhere between that of a law-abiding citizen
and that of a prisoner-but closer to that of a law-abiding citizen. 201
For instance, after one year and upon a showing of good conduct, a
supervised releasee can have the supervised release terminated if
the termination is in the interest of justice; however, a prisoner's
restricted expectation of privacy is limited to the prison cell. 202
Thus, the court found that a: supervised releasee's expectation of
privacy is significant.203 .
In weighing the interests of the individual's privacy right and
the government's alleged special need, the court acknowledged the
government's success rate of catching criminals due to the DNA
indexing database. 204 Where there is a great public interest at
stake, suspicionless searches may be upheld. 205 However, the court
did not believe that the government's interests outweighed the ex
treme bodily intrusion and resulting invasion of privacy that oc
curred when DNA was stored in a centralized database. 206 The
court recognized that, in the future, the stored DNA may be found
to contain trait coding. 207 Further, if the DNA falls into the wrong
hands it may be used for improper purposes, which would be a ma
jor privacy concern. 208 The intrusion occurred at various levels: the
extraction, analysis, storage, and potential misuse of the DNA.209
The court acknowledged that certain citizens have lowered ex
pectations of privacy, such as a person who has been convicted, or a
200. Id. at 267 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984), which held
that a prisoner does not have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" from his prison cell
being searched).
201. Id. at 267-68.
202. /d. at 267 (citing 18 U.S.c. § 3583(e)(I) (2000)).
203. /d. at 268.
204. Id.
205. Id.; see, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989). The special needs test is invoked to "prevent the development of hazardous
conditions or to detect violations that rarely generate articulable grounds for searching
any particular place or person." Id. at 668; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (holding that the government's interest in protecting
against serious accidents justified the mandatory blood and urine testing); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976) (holding that searching vehicles at the
country's borders without individualized suspicion was acceptable given the nation's
interest in maintaining secure borders).
206. Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 270.
207. Id. at 269.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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person on supervised release. 210 And yet, the court still believed
that a person on supervised release has a privacy interest in his
DNA that outweighs the government's interest in solving crimes,211
especially in light of the severity of the intrusion. 212
2.

Weikert II Reversed Weikert I But Limited Its Holding

In Weikert II the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit re
versed Weikert I and held that it is constitutional to extract and
store the DNA of an individual on supervised release in CODIS
under the DNA Act using the totality of the circumstances tesp13
The First Circuit joined the majority of federal courts that use the
totality of the circumstances test when examining challenges to laws
that call for mandatory extraction of DNA.214 The totality of the
circumstances test analyzes the reasonableness of a search by
weighing the extent to which the search intrudes upon an individ
ual's privacy and the extent to which the search is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 215 The court re
jected the notion that the special needs test is the only test that may
be applied when there is no individualized suspicion against an indi
vidual.2 16 To support this proposition,217 it cited Sampson v. Cali
fornia, which utilized the totality of the circumstances test to
determine that an individual on conditioned release may be
searched absent any individualized suspicion. 218 Because the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit in Weikert II viewed Weikert's sta
tus as a supervised releasee, the same as Sampson's status as a con
210.

211.
212.

[d. at 266-68.
[d. at 270.
[d. at 269.

213. United States v. Weikert (Weikert II), 504 F.3d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g
denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007).
214. [d. at 8. The majority of courts use the totality of the circumstances test. See
United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Quander, 440
F.3d 489, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir.
2005); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kin
cade, 379 F.3d 813, 832 (9th Cir. 2004); Groceman v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411,
413-14 (5th Cir. 2004); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1992). A minor
ity of courts use the special needs test. See United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 79
n.6 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003).
215. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001).
216. Weikert II, 504 F.3d at 8.
217.

[d.

218.

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 nA (2006).
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ditioned releasee, it held that the totality of the circumstances test
must apply.219
Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the court
weighed Weikert's interest in privacy against the government's in
terest in conducting the search (i.e., extraction and storage of DNA
in CODIS).220 Again, the court found that an individual on super
vised release is like an individual on conditioned release, as in
Sampson, and held that such an individual has a lower expectation
of privacy by virtue of his status. 221 It further found that the intru
sion is minimal because the extraction of DNA does not include
much risk. 222 According to the court, the storage of DNA does not
pose a risk unless the DNA information is released and improperly
utilized by third parties and the DNA is found to be more than
junk.223 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that the
government has a strong interest in identifying, monitoring, and re
habilitating criminals and in solving crimes. 224 When balancing the
parties' interests, the court concluded that the government's inter
est outweighed Weikert's.225
Limitations restrict Weikert II's holding, however. 226 It applies
only to individuals subject to the DNA Act and not free and law
abiding citizens.227 Given that this Note does not focus on chal
lenges to the DNA Act, but rather free and law-abiding family
members, the appropriate analysis that this Note will utilize is the
special needs test, as in Weikert I, as opposed to the totality of the
circumstances test in Weikert II. It is also worth noting that the
Weikert II court stated that it would reexamine the issue if the
stored DNA is scientifically concluded to be more than just junk
and is potentially, or consequently, misused. 228 The court's conclu
sion leaves the door open for further evaluation of the privacy im
plications of CODIS.

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Weikert II, 504 F.3d at 9.
Id. at 11-14.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12-15.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 15-18.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 13.
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ANALYSIS

A Family Member Has Standing Because He Has a
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Against the
Familial Search

1. The Fourth Amendment Should Be Broadly Interpreted
to Include Common DNA
The term "person" in the Fourth Amendment229 should not be
narrowly construed to mean the actual person. Common or shared
DNA is, in essence, a partial genetic makeup of the family mem
ber's person. Rather, the term "person" should be construed more
broadly to protect the family member so as to avoid the denial of
the family member's reasonable expectation of privacy simply be
cause the intrusion does not occur to his actual person. 230
The Fourth Amendment expressly protects "persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures."231
However, Katz v. United States, one of the most significant Fourth
Amendment decisions, held that people-not places-are pro
tected by the Fourth Amendment.232 Katz overturned Olmstead v.
United States ,233 which read the Constitution more narrowly, hold
229. U.S. CaNST. amend. IV.
230. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). It has long
been recognized that the Fourth Amendment does protect a person's reasonable expec
tation of privacy.
231. U.S. CaNST. amend. IV.
232. David A. Sklansky, Katz v. United States: The Limits of Aphorism, in FaUN.
DATION PRESS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 223 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006). Char
lie Katz, the defendant in Katz, made his living by wagering on sporting events for him
and for others, in large part, across state lines by the telephone. Id. at 224. Charlie did
well for himself; he was living in a hotel room on Sunset Boulevard in Los Angeles. Id.
On an informant's tip, five FBI agents began an investigation. Id. Everyday the FBI
watched Charlie leave his hotel and walk to a group of three phone booths down the
street and make several calls. Id. The FBI placed a recording device on top of one of
the phone booths, microphones on the back of two of the booths, and an out-of-order
sign on the third booth. Id. at 224-25. The FBI recorded numerous one-sided conversa
tions (Charlie's side), which strongly indicated that Charlie was placing bets illegally.
Id. at 225. The phone company confirmed that the calls were traveling across state lines
and the FBI arrested and charged Charlie with interstate wagering. Id.
233. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S.
347, and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Olmstead was a lieutenant with the
Seattle Police Department who was fired because he was caught smuggling alcohol
from Canada during Prohibition. Sklansky, supra note 232, at 226. Afterward he be
came a full-time rum runner, making up to $200,000 per month in sales. Id. Olmstead
conducted a lot of his business over the telephone. Id. at 227. Despite a general disap
proval of wiretapping at the time-it was illegal in Washington and against federal pol
icy-prohibition agents monitored Olmstead's calls. Id. They obtained enough
information to convict Olmstead and twenty of his associates. Id.
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ing that the Fourth Amendment protects only material things such a
person and his house, papers, and effects.234 With the demise of
Olmstead, the notion that the Fourth Amendment analysis was
based in property law was extinguished. 235 Although the parties in
Katz put great emphasis on the issue of whether the phone booth
was a "constitutionally protected area,"236 the Supreme Court re
jected the notion that the "area" was of constitutional significance,
because the court has "never suggested that this concept can serve
as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem."237
Fortunately, the Supreme Court had the forethought to avoid
making bright-line rules about what constitutes a constitutionally
protected area. 238 The Constitution expressly guarantees the right
of the people to be free unreasonable searches of their person. 239
However, it is clear in Brian's hypothetical that the DNA, which
was searched in the database, was not extracted from Brian's per
son.240 If the hypothetical was analyzed under a rigid reading of the
Constitution, Brian would have no protection from the familial
search because Brian's person was not actually physically searched.
Such an analysis would deprive Brian of his expectation of privacy
in the personal and common DNA information that Brian shares
with his brother. In light of Katz ,241 it should not be dispositive that
the family member's actual person has not been searched, as long a
family member such as Brian has a reasonable expectation of pri
vacy in the common DNA. This is true especially in light of the fact
that the content of the search reveals extremely private
information. 242
234.
235.
236.

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)).
Id. at 351. During oral argument before the Supreme Court, Katz's counsel

framed the issue to eliminate the typical property-based Fourth Amendment analysis.
Sklansky, supra note 232, at 243. Counsel argued that the Court must not focus on
whether an area is constitutionally protected, but rather "whether a reasonable person,
objectively looking at the communications setting, the situation and the location of the
communicator and communicatee, would ... reasonably believe that the communica
tion was intended to be confidential." Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 1,
Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (No. 35)). The point being that the protected interest follows the
person. Id.
237. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 n.9.
238. See id. at 359.
239. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
240. See supra INTRODUCTION, Part A.
241. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (rejecting a rigid reading of the Constitution and stat
ing that the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy interests of people and not places).
242. See United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265 (D. Mass. 2007) (re
marking that DNA information "is of the most sensitive and personal nature, and it is
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In Minnesota v. Olson, the Court ruled that a person may have
a reasonable expectation of privacy against governmental intrusion
in a home that is not his own.243 The government argued that Ol
son, an overnight guest, did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his host's home because he did not have exclusive control
of the premises and was not free to exclude or admit others as he
wished,244 The Court rejected this contention and ruled that exclu
sive control over the place searched is not a necessary factor in or
der to find that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the place searched. 245 The Court reasoned that society recognizes
the individual's expectation of privacy in the host's home because
being a host or an overnight guest is a long-standing tradition in our
country that serves many beneficial functions in our society-most
people will either be a host or an overnight guest in their life
. time. 246 Overnight guests seek shelter from the elements when at
the host's home. 247 People are most vulnerable when they sleep, so
they expect privacy and safety when in the host's home. 248
Just as society acknowledges that a person reasonably expects
privacy from governmental intrusion in his host's home, a family
member has the same type of reasonable expectation that the DNA
he shares in common with his family will be kept private from un
reasonable governmental intrusion. In the hypothetical, Brian took
great pains to disassociate from his family. Therefore, he has a sub
jective expectation of privacy that the genetic link will not be traced
by the government or anyone else. Furthermore, Brian's expecta
tion of privacy should be recognized by society as reasonable be
cause family relationships are considered private and sacred. 249
inconceivable that one would expect this information to be readily available to the gov
ernment or to the public").
243. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 99.
246. Id. at 98-99.
247. Id. at 99.
248. Id.
249. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (calling a family relationship a
private realm in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment issue); Washington v. Gluck
sberg, 521 U.S. 702, 771 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (acknowledging that there is a
broad liberty interest to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions into the
privacy of family life); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,851 (re
counting that the Constitution affords protection to individuals with respect to decisions
involving their family relationships in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment ques
tion); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary lnt'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987)
(stating that family relationships, in the context of a First Amendment issue, "presup
pose 'deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with
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It is immaterial that Brian does not have exclusive control over
his sibling's DNA, and that he does not have an exact match to his
sibling's DNA under the Olson Court's reasoning. Brian's convict
brother is, in effect, the "host" and Brian is the "overnight guest."
Clearly, society must value the privacy interests associated with
family relationships to a greater extent than the privacy expecta
tions associated with being an overnight guest. 250 Therefore, it is
logical to conclude that society would recognize Brian's expectation
of privacy against unreasonable governmental intrusion simply
based on the fact that Brian is genetically linked to a person with a
criminal record.

2. The Lack of a Physical Intrusion in a Familial Search Is
Immaterial
The government would likely challenge a family member's ex
pectation of privacy in common DNA because the DNA is not
physically extracted from the family member, and yields no highly
personal or intimate information. Therefore, the government
would argue that the family member has no standing to assert a
Fourth Amendment claim because he has not been subject to an
actual governmental intrusion. However, neither the level of per
sonal information revealed nor the lack of a physical intrusion de
termines the validity of a Fourth Amendment claim. In Kyllo v.
United States, the Supreme Court noted that, in the past, an intru
sion was easier to discern because it was based on the archaic prop
erty concept that no search exists unless there was an actual
physical intrusion into the place searched. 251 The law has changed,
however, and property law concepts have been separated from
Fourth Amendment analysis. 252 After abandoning the property
concept and in light of ever-advancing technology, Kyllo examined
what a reasonable expectation of privacy might be. 253 Aware of
technology's potential harm to individuals' right to privacy, the
Court stated that "[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree
of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been
whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but
also distinctively personal aspects of one's life'" (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984))).
250. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 99.
251. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). In Kyllo, the government used
heat-sensing thermal technology from a parked car across the street from the defen
dant's home to determine if he was growing marijuana. Id. at 29-30.
252. Id. at 32.
253. Id. at 33.
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entirely unaffected by the advance of technology."254 Therefore,
the Court did not impose a narrow understanding of the meaning of
"intrusion." The Court recognized that people's expectation of pri
vacy in their homes has "roots deep" in our society and "to with
draw protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit
police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment."255
Kyllo's dissent argued that the thermal imaging technology did
not constitute a search because there is no actual intrusion since it
only gleans images that radiate from outside of the house and by an
"off-the-wall" observation, as opposed to a "through-the-wall" ob
servation. 256 However, the Court strongly disagreed because it had
previously rejected such a narrow reading of the Fourth Amend
ment in Katz. 257 Katz held that the use of eavesdropping technol
ogy that only detected sound waves emanating from a phone booth
constituted an invasive search even though the sound waves were
only picked up from the exterior of the phone booth.258 Refusing
to overturn the holding in Katz, and in order to preserve the pri
vacy which was envisioned by the Framers of the Fourth Amend
ment, the Court held that there can be an intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area despite a lack of physical intru
sion.259 Of great import to the Kyllo Court was the danger that
more advanced technology was already being used, or being devel
oped that would render "the homeowner at the mercy of advancing
technology, including imaging technology that could discern all
human activity in the home."26o
In the case of familial searches, the government may make an
"off-the-walls" type of argument, contending that the search is con
ducted against DNA already existing in the database and extracted
from a convict, not the family member, and therefore the informa
tion gleaned is not a physical intrusion against the family member.
However, this notion was rejected in Kyllo because a lack of physi
cal intrusion does not mean that a legitimate interest of privacy has
not been invaded. The notion should be rejected in the case of fa
milial searches too. Kyllo was more concerned with the unfair ad
254.
255.
256.
257.
25S.
259.
260.

[d. at 33-34.
[d.

[do
[do
[do
[do
[do

at 35.
at 36.
at 340
at 35-36.
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vantages that the government might gain through the use of new
technology, which would erode the Fourth Amendment's protec
tion to the detriment of society. The familial searching technology
has the same unfair effect, and will unfortunately harm society.
Members of society will no longer be able to rely on their own good
and honest behavior to keep them free from the government's
watchful and intrusive eye.
There is a limitation set forth by Kyllo.261 When new technol
ogy is used to conduct a search, a person cannot reasonably expect
to be free from that particular type of intrusion if the technology is
readily available for "general public use."262 This is because a per
son cannot reasonably claim to have an expectation of privacy in
something that is open for the public to view. 263 If the technology is
available to the public, this would grant it the ability to gain an
open view, and thus one cannot expect such privacy.264 Today
CODIS is not available for public use; it is limited to governmental
use. 265 Without the use of the familial search technology, the re
sulting partial match is not readily discernable by the public.
Therefore, a family member's expectation of privacy in his common
DNA can be considered constitutionally reasonable because tech
nology is not available to the public that can produce accurate
DNA matches revealing the number of alleles that two relatives
have in common and the degree of their genetic relationship.

261. Id.
262. Id. at 34.
263. Id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
264. See id.
265. See Combined DNA Index System, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that CODIS is
an FBI program that enables national, state, and local crime labs to work together).
Individuals can have familial DNA testing performed by private companies or self-spec
imen DNA testing kits. See generally Genetica, DNA Paternity Test, http://www.
genetica.com/index.php (last visited Dec. 29, 2007). In a private setting, the individual
must suspect a particular person of having a familial relationship and collect a sample of
his DNA to conduct the analysis between the two individuals' DNA. See Genetica,
Accredited DNA Testing Lab, http://www.genetica.com/paternity/self.php (last visited
Dec. 29, 2007). Clearly, a familial search in CODIS is distinguished from the private
DNA testing technology that is available to the public. The technology involved in
CODIS allows one sample of DNA to be compared against millions of random offender
DNA samples, having no particular suspect, to find a familial match. A member of the
public would be unable to do a private test to ascertain a familial relationship without
having the suspect's DNA for comparison and does not have access to the CODIS
database. Therefore, the CODIS technology is not available to the public in the man
ner required to invoke Kyllo's physical intrusion exception.
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It Is Immaterial that Junk DNA Is Currently Believed to
Lack Intimate Information

The government would likely argue that a familial search is not
a search protected by the Fourth Amendment because it reveals no
intimate information and, therefore, a person cannot have a reason
able expectation of privacy against a familial search. The basis of
this argument would be that common DNA is not protected by the
Fourth Amendment because it is not extracted from the family
member who is a defendant and the type and extent of intimate
information stored in common DNA has no legal significance. The
point is that the common DNA that is searched contains informa
tion that is personal to the composition of the individual family
member's genetic make-up-his "person."266 In Kyllo, the Su
preme Court examined whether a person can have a reasonable ex
pectation of privacy against a search that reveals no specific
intimate information. 267 The Court said that it had never adopted
the notion that "the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home
[is] tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information
obtained."268
For instance, an officer who simply peaks through an open
door and observes a rug has seen something intimate because "all
details are intimate details" in the home, since the home is pro
tected by the Fourth Amendment.269 Although the Court refused
to say that the invasion must reveal intimate details to be consid
ered intrusive and protected by the Fourth Amendment, it stated
that the heat in the defendant's home was an intimate detail be
cause it came from within the protected home. 27o
Likewise, family members share common DNA. The portion
of DNA that is unique to the defendant family member is some
thing that reveals highly personal genetic information that is found
within his person, although it is also found in the convict family
member's person. This is a protected area and, therefore, is an inti
mate detail that society should readily accept as deserving constitu
tional protection. It could indicate whether a person has a
propensity for addiction to drugs or alcohol or other traits, or it
may reveal information about whether a person has a genetic disor
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
[d.
[d.

[d. at 38.
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der. 271 Applying this to Brian's hypothetical, the familial search re
vealed information which is stored in Brian's own person, and
therefore it is highly intimate. Since it is highly intimate, Brian has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common DNA he shares
with his family.
Furthermore, the depth of intimate knowledge contained in
DNA is not yet totally understood. Technology is ever advancing.
Society should not be surprised if someday technological advances
bring a new understanding that intimate details are stored in junk
DNA. Then, family members like Brian who do not have a lowered
expectation of privacy may have their DNA information analyzed
and used in ways not even dreamt of in this modern world, simply
based on a genetic relationship to a convict.
History has demonstrated how the expanded use of data col
lected by the government can be detrimental to American citi
zens. 272 It is entirely plausible that, although the government
initially has a limited use for the stored DNA, the use will be ex
panded and the data collected will eventually be used in ways that
will further impede on society's freedom from governmental intru
sion. The government will have a plethora of information about
individuals' biological and psychological make-ups273 and a new
and powerful means of surveillance, which could subject people to
arbitrary governmental intrusions. 274
Today, the DNA stored in CODIS is considered by the govern
ment to be junk DNA with no real use other than for identification.
However, some scientists now question whether the DNA is actu
ally junk, and believe it may have the potential to reveal "informa

271. DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberties Project, supra note 37.
272. United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 280 (D. Mass. 2007) (predict
ing that the government will exploit the DNA data it has COllected). For instance, social
security numbers were initially assigned to citizens for retirement programs, but now
the numbers are used as a "universal identification number." Id. Furthermore, census
records initially collected by the government for statistical use were later used to assist
in the Japanese internment program of World War II. Id.
273. Meghan Riley, Comment, American Courts Are Drowning in the "Gene
Pool": Excavating the Slippery Slope Mechanisms Behind Judicial Endorsement of DNA
Databases, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 115, 145 (2005).
274. See id.
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tion beyond mere identity, relating to health, race, and gender,"275
and may someday reveal the "very basis of human complexity."276
As an example of how the stored DNA could be misused, the
government could conduct genetic profiling based on individuals'
familial relationships to convicts to try to predict whether crime
runs in families. 277 Once a family member is genetically profiled
based on "perceived biological truths," a family member may be
come susceptible to fulfilling the "genetic. prophecy," and become a
criminal himself.278 Furthermore, the DNA information could be
distributed to third parties, either unintentionally or without au
thorization. 279 Family members could also potentially be stereo
typed based on other perceived genetic predispositions, such as to
disease or sexual orientation. 280 Then, as if genetic profiling is not
intrusive enough, the family member's genetic profile can be
searched time and again. 281
The intimate information contained in common DNA
whether now known, or soon to be learned through advances in
science-is information in which a family member has a reasonable
expectation of privacy against governmental intrusion. Before soci
ety willingly accepts familial searches, it should understand that the
practice could open doors that will not easily close. Genetic infor
mation is the most intimate and private information. Sacrificing
this privacy will erode the Fourth Amendment's protections into
meaningless words.

275. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 849-50 (9th Cir. 2004) (Rein
hardt, J., dissenting); Gilbert J. Villaflor, Comment, Capping the Government's Needle:
The Need to Protect Parolees' Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests from Suspicionless
DNA Searches in United States v. Kincade, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 2347, 2363 (2005).
276. Riley, supra note 273, at 129 (quoting Clive Cookson, Regulatory Genes
Found in 'Junk DNA,' FIN. TIMES (London), June 4, 2004, at 11).
277. See DNA Database Can Flag Suspects, supra note 55.
278. See generally Radhika Rao, A Veil of Genetic Ignorance? Protecting Genetic
Privacy to Ensure Equality, 51 VILL. L. REV. 827, 828-29 (2006).
279. See generally Yael Bregman-Eschet, Genetic Databases and Biobanks: Who
Controls Our Genetic Privacy?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 14
15 (2006) (discussing the possibility that third parties might use genetic bio-samples to
profile people for genetic dispositions; for example, the military could analyze DNA to
determine sexual orientation).
280. See Rao, supra note 278, at 828.
281. See generally Villaflor, supra note 276.
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The Weikert II court joined the majority of courts that adopt
the totality of the circumstances test to analyze Fourth Amendment
challenges to mandatory DNA extractions under the DNA Act. 282
However, Weikert II and other cases that utilize the totality of the
circumstances test are not on point with a familial search scenario
because the constitutionality of the DNA Act is not at issue. The
reasonableness of a search conducted without any individualized
suspicion, against a free and law-abiding citizen, must therefore be
analyzed under the special needs test. .Although reversed, Weikert
I viewed a supervised releasee's expectation of privacy closer to
that of a law-abiding citizen,283 like a family member. Therefore,
Weikert I is useful for its discussion about the special needs test and
the balancing of interests, and will be used for its analysis in this
Part.
1.

The Primary Purpose of Conducting a Familial Search Is
to Solve a Crime-Thus No Special Need Exists

Familial searches are unreasonable under the Fourth Amend
ment because a familial search does not serve any purpose beyond
assisting the government to solve more crimes. When running a
familial search, the government has no suspect. The familial search
is in fact conducted in order to contrive individualized suspicion
against a convict's family member in order to solve a particular
crime. 284 For example, before the law enforcement authorities ran
the familial search in Brian's hypothetical, they had ruled out Brian
as the culprit. They used the search to implicate Brian.
In the case of familial searches, the government should be re
quired to assert a compelling and special need in order to justify the
search when there is no individualized suspicion against the family
member. The government's primary purpose for running a familial
search, however, is to solve a particular crime or to "uncover evi
dence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."285 It does not serve a
282. United States v. Weikert (Weikert lJ), 504 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g
denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007).
283. United States v. Weikert (Weikert I), 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 267 (D. Mass.
2006), rev'd, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g denied en bane, 504 FJd 20 (1st Cir. 2007).
284. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
285. Cf City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) (stating that be
cause the primary purpose of the narcotics checkpoint is to uncover evidence of ordi
nary criminal wrongdoing, it is not a special need).
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great societal purpose, such as removing intoxicated drivers from
the road,286 or protecting people on the railways from the conse
quences of intoxicated railroad employees287-purposes that were
considered legitimate special needs according to the Supreme
Court.
One of the main reasons for allowing a search based on a spe
cial need is that it would be impractical to obtain a warrarit. This is
exemplified in T.L.D.'s school setting where the need to act swiftly
to protect the children outweighed the minimal intrusion of the
search and rendered the warrant requirement impractical.288 The
need to run a familial search is not one that requires an immediate
response to safeguard members of society. Such a response would
render the warrant and probable cause requirements so impractical
as to justify dispensing with them. 289 Rather, the familial search is
more like the unconstitutional roadblock in Edmond 290 and the un
constitutional drug tests in Ferguson,291 which were designed prima
rily for an ordinary law enforcement purpose: generating evidence
to solve a crime.
Courts that have upheld the mandatory extraction of DNA
have justified the searches by claiming that the government has a
special need and immediate non-law-enforcement purpose to build
a DNA-indexing database. 292 The district court in Weikert I saw
through the purported special need to build a DNA-indexing
database, stating, "The government's purpose ... is not to get 'in
formation about a crime in all likelihood committed by others' ...
but instead to determine whether the searched individual has com
mitted a crime. "293
286. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,451 (1990); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
287. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1989).
288. New Jersey v. T.L.D., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
289. This result was envisioned by Justice Blackmun at the inception of the spe
cial needs test. Id. at 353.
290. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42-43 (holding that a drug interdiction conducted to
find evidence of a crime violates the Fourth Amendment).
291. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82-84 (2001) (holding that a
drug testing program designed to find evidence of illegal drug use by pregnant women,
which would ultimately protect unborn babies, was unconstitutional).
292. Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 655, 668 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003).
293. United States v. Weikert (Weikert J), 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (D. Mass.
2006) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423-24 (2004», rev'd, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2007), reh'g denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007).
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It is absurd to say that the primary purpose of CODIS is to

build a DNA-indexing database rather than to solve crimes. But it
is even more absurd to argue that a familial search is anything other
than an effort to solve a particular crime. Weikert I aptly recog
nized that the FBI's own website states that the purpose of CODIS
is to solve crimes. 294 Therefore, it is ludicrous to assert that the
purpose of a smaller search, such as a familial one, could be any
thing other than to solve crime. 295 It is important to distinguish the
primary purpose from the ultimate, broader social goal, otherwise
the special needs test will "immunize" all searches conducted ab
sent individualized suspicion, thereby creating a police state. 296
The government is likely to assert that the special need for fa
milial DNA tests is something akin to the "information seeking"
activity held lawful in Lidster. 297 It will claim that the familial
search is merely a tool to gain information about who may have
been present or may have witnessed a crime, rather than implicate
that family member as the prime suspect. But the familial search is
unlike the type of information-seeking search in Lidster because it
is not designed to gather information from someone who probably
did not commit the crime. In actuality, the sole and immediate pur
pose of a familial search is to obtain a lead to solve a crime commit
ted by a convict's family member.
2.

A Family Member's Privacy Interest Outweighs the
Interests of the Government

If the government can surmount the special need hurdle, the

government must still show that its intrusion is justified because its
interest in the special need outweighs the privacy interest of the
affected family member. 298 In conducting this balancing test, it is
important to understand that not every citizen is afforded the same
level or degree of interest in his privacy. In other words, a person's
interest in privacy is graded on a scale of reasonableness based on
that person's status in the legal system.
For instance, the Supreme Court has held that a prisoner can
not reasonably expect privacy in his prison cell, nor can society
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id.
See generally id.
See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84.
Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423-24 (holding that a search conducted to learn infor

mation about a crime committed by another person is constitutional).
298. Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 264 (citing Nicholas v. Goard, 430 F.3d 652, 664
n.22 (2d Cir. 2005».
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deem such an expectation of privacy reasonable. 299 Prisoners are
confined involuntarily because they have engaged in behavior that
society rejects. 3OO Such behavior demonstrates that the prisoners
were unable to conform to society's notions of acceptable conduct
and unable to exercise self-restraint. Riots, murder of inmates and
personnel, suicide, rape, assault, and drug trafficking are some of
the dangers that lurk in prisons. 301 Prison authorities have a duty to
keep the prisoners and third parties safe. 302 Thus, the Supreme
Court has ruled that a prisoner has no Fourth Amendment right
against governmental searches and seizures within a prison cell be
cause the prisoner's interest in privacy is diminished by his legal
status and because the important governmental need outweighs the
intrusion. 303
Imprisonment in solitary confinement at a maximum security
prison is at the most extreme end of the punishment continuum and
a few hours of community service is on the lower end. 304 There are
many points on the continuum that fall between the two ex
tremes. 305 For instance, other points on the continuum are me
dium- and low-level security imprisonment, parole, probation, and
halfway houses. 306 With each point on the continuum, the scope of
a convict's privacy interest must be examined.
With respect to a probationer,307 the Supreme Court held that
a warrantless search of a probationer's home, authorized by a state
regulation, is not a Fourth Amendment violation. 30B While a proba
tioner does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home,309
probation is a criminal sanction for the probationer's antisocial be
havior that resulted in the probationer's conviction. 31o As such,
probationers do not have the same degree of privacy interest as a
299. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984).
300. Id. at 526.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987).
305. [d.
306. [d.
307. United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 274 (D. Mass. 2007) (defining
probation as "'[a] court-imposed criminal sentence that, subject to state conditions, re
leases a convicted person into the community instead of sending the criminal to jail or
prison.'" (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (7th ed. 1999»).
308. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872.
309. [d. at 873.
310. [d. at 874.
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law-abiding citizen. 311 Rather, the probationer's release into soci
ety is conditioned upon restrictions. 312 Some of the supervisory re
strictions imposed on probationers are often mandatory
employment, avoidance of certain places and people, weekends in
prison, avoidance of alcohol, and allowance of searches by proba
tion officers. 313 These restrictions help to assist in rehabilitation,
protect citizens, reduce the likelihood of recidivism, and ensure that
the probationer is safely integrating back into society.314 The intru
sion of a probationer's privacy interest is justified because the gov
ernment's special need outweighs the probationer's privacy interest,
and a warrant requirement would be impractical.3 15
Although the court of appeals in Weikert II reversed Weikert I,
the holding was limited to individuals challenging the DNA Act,
such as supervised releasees. 316 The court of appeals believed that,
based on Weikert's status as a supervised releasee, he had a re
duced expectation of privacy that was outweighed by the govern
ment's interest in identifying, monitoring, and rehabilitating
criminals, and solving crimes more accurately and efficiently.317
The holding does not apply to a family member who is a free and
law-abiding citizen with an undiminished expectation of privacy.
The district court's decision in Weikert I is valuable for analysis
regarding the balancing of interests, particularly the intrusiveness of
storing and analyzing DNA in CODIS. The court believed that an
analysis of DNA's identifying information constituted a more se
vere intrusion than the actual extraction of DNA, which requires
penetration of the skin. 318 In fact, the "startling advance of technol
ogy" will enable DNA samples to be turned into profiles and
searched time and again throughout a person's lifetime. 319 This
would constitute an extreme governmental intrusion of a family
311. Id.
312. !d.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 875.
315. Id. at 876-80.
316. United States v. Weikert (Weikert II), 504 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g
denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007).
317. !d. at 11.
318. United States v. Weikert (Weikert I), 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266 (D. Mass.
2006), rev'd, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007).
319. See United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 198 (3d Cir. 2005) (McKee, J.,
dissenting opinion) (quoting United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 867 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting».
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member's identity given that it is becoming more apparent that vast
medical information can be revealed from DNA.320
Sometimes an individual's privacy expectation can be out
weighed by serious public concerns, as in T.L.O. when the Supreme
Court found that students' have a legitimate privacy expectation
that is outweighed by the need to keep students safe. 321 A pris
oner's expectation of privacy against searches in his prison cell is
obviously lower than a free, law-abiding citizen's right against
searches because the prisoner is under the control of the state. 322
However, it is unquestionable that an innocent relative of a convict,
such as Brian, has an undiminished expectation of privacy, which is
not lowered merely because of his relation to the convict. If the
family member is a free, law-abiding citizen, then he has a reasona
ble expectation that identifying DNA information will not be re
leased without his consent.
The government's interest in running familial searches is out
weighed by the family member's significant interest in keeping his
genetic information free from governmental intrusion. Assuming
that the government will argue that the familial search is no more
than a tool to seek information about a given crime and such pur
pose is a valid special need, the purpose must outweigh the family
member's liberty interest in order to be considered a reasonable
and constitutional search.
Familial searches may help investigators solve more crimes. In
a case where there is a ten percent chance of solving a crime
through DNA, the estimated chance of solving it through a familial
search only increases to fourteen percent. 323 However, this alone
cannot be a justification for violating family members' liberty inter
ests. The familial search does not provide any additional safety
measure to the public greater than general law enforcement would
provide. The government has no special interest that should be af
forded greater weight than a family member who has an undimin
ished expectation of privacy and therefore the search must be
deemed unreasonable.
320. See Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (stating that" 'recent scientific studies
have begun to question the notion that junk DNA does not contain useful genetic pro
gramming material'" (quoting Kincade, 379 F.3d at 818 n.6)).
321. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 352-53 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
322. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,525-26 (1984).
323. Schmid, supra note 60.
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CONCLUSION

The expanded use of CODIS to include familial searches is a
serious intrusion into family members' expectations of privacy. It is
an unnecessary intrusion by the government, since it serves no spe
cial need beyond normal law enforcement activities. Law enforce
ment authorities are simply making use of the tool as a convenient
way to sidestep the warrant and probable cause requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. Law enforcement authorities must be re
quired to obtain a warrant based on probable cause prior to con
ducting a familial search. Their problem is, of course, that they do
not have probable cause to suspect any single individual in CODIS,
and therefore would be unable to obtain the warrant. The unfortu
nate result of familial searches will be to create suspect pools based
solely on genetics and not on any individualized suspicion of wrong
doing. Citizens value their privacy. With the familial search, inno
cent citizens have lost a measure of privacy that they cannot protect
against. We can disassociate from our family members, but we will
always share their DNA.
Revisiting the hypothetical at the beginning of this Note,324 the
injustice that may result from this investigatory tool is plain and
grim. A reputable person such as Brian, someone who has led an
innocent life even if his family members have not, can find himself a
criminal suspect because his genetics have characteristics in com
mon with his convicted family member. It is doubtful that the por
tion of society related to convicts will be prepared to become
criminal suspects themselves based on their genetics. Hopefully,
this expanded use of CODIS will be rejected by society, the courts,
and Congress.
Law enforcement has gone too far. As citizens, we must de
fend our right to be secure from arbitrary intrusions by law enforce
ment authorities because this right is paramount to our living as a
free society.325 If allowed, this will put us in a position similar to
that of the colonist who protested against Writs of Assistance, a
position that the Framers of the Constitution recognized when they
adopted the Fourth Amendment. 326 As technology advances, so

324. See supra INTRoDucnoN, Part A.
325. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949».
326. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969).
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should our awareness that such advances could lead to arbitrary
governmental intrusions, despite the good intentions of law en
forcement authorities.
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